This study deals with a dual channel supply chain where the selling price of each player, delivery time for direct channel and retail service dependent demand structures are considered for manufacturer and retailer. In the direct channel, the manufacturer sells the products directly to the customers with a maximum mentioned delivery time. The delivery time of the products is adjustable according to customers' demand with an extra delivery charge. In the retail channel, the customers are extra benefited by the retail service and direct connection with the products. Selling price for the direct market is considered as lower than the retail market selling price. The behavior of the model under the integrated system is analyzed. In the decentralized structure, vertical Nash and manufacturer Stackelberg models are also discussed. The sensitivity of the key parameters is examined to test the feasibility of the model. Finally, a numerical example with graphical illustrations is provided to investigate the proposed model. so far guided 48 research scholars and has published 245 papers in international journals of repute in the areas of fluid mechanics, solid mechanics, computer science, atmospheric science, operations research, mathematical ecology, history of mathematics and marketing science.
Introduction
The purchasing behaviors of the consumers is a very important part to make decisions for a company.
The use of direct market shopping (also known as online shopping) has been growing swiftly between the consumers. In many ways, the companies are now racing to catch up on the market in order to increase their sales. Nowadays, with the support of the new technology and the internet, many persons around the world have been starting to buy products online by simply giving some clicks at their homes. Most of the companies already have web pages that allow them to sell products and services via the internet. But, there exist some issues in the online shopping such as if the web site is reliable or not for making the payment, or if the product quality is as good as mentioned on the web site, delivery time, delivery person's behavior, among others. Normally, shopping online will take a few hours to a few days. Furthermore, it will take several weeks to deliver the items to the consumers depending on the delivery terms of the websites or the distances. In the physical store, the customers may see and feel the products or may try them on before purchasing or may talk to a sales associate in-person before taking a final decision. Also, in this case, they go to the store, buy the products and come back home with the products immediately. Therefore, the discussion is so complicated that one needs to find the best answer to 1) how much should a company spend for online and 2) how much should a company spend for offline? So, now the companies need to find the proper business strategies to optimize their profit with a mix of online and offline businesses. Now, our aim is to study a dual channel supply chain model comprised of one manufacturer and one retailer considering the selling price, delivery time and retail service. After reviewing the existing literature related to the study we found that the channel competition has been analyzed through a channel structure with two competing manufacturers and one intermediary that sells both manufacturers' products by Choi (9) .
He investigated the effect of cost differences on equilibrium prices and profits. Also, three noncooperative games, two Stackelberg and one Nash games are analyzed in that paper. Later, (10) extends the model of Choi (9) and analyzes competitive pricing strategies of duopoly manufacturers who process differentiated products and duopoly retailers who vend both products. Afterward, Chiang et al. (8) build a price setting game among a manufacturer and his/her independent retailer in a dual-channel supply chain. They study the incentives for a manufacturer to make his/her own direct channel to contend with his/her retailer.
They found that direct marketing can aid the manufacturer to raise profits by sales through his/her retailer. On the other hand, Cai (3) shows the influence of channel structures and channel coordination on the supplier, the retailer and the whole supply chain in two single-channel and two dual-channel supply chains. At the same time, Bin et al. (2) study joint decision on production and pricing under information asymmetry in the context of an online dual channel supply chain. They also discuss whether a single contract or a menu of contracts is better for the supplier as a leader of dual channels. Hua et al. (12) develop a dual-channel supply chain where the effects of the delivery lead time of the direct channel on the pricing decisions of manufacturer and retailer are analyzed. After, Huang et al. (13) develop a two-period pricing and production decision model for a manufacturer-retailer dual-channel supply chain where the demand is disrupted in the planning horizon. Basically, they analyze the price and production decisions to optimize their profit under a disruption scenario. Xu et al. (29) extend the work of Chiang et al. (8) by showing the channel configuration strategy on the price and delivery lead time decisions under either the manufacturer-owned or the decentralized model. Chen et al. (6) examine the situation where the manufacturer and the retailer both have a preference on a dual-channel supply chain. They also discuss the coordination of the model with different contract policies in such a way that both the members of the chain can be benefitted. Dan et al. (11) analyze the decisions on retail services and price in both centralized and decentralized dual-channel supply chains and study the impacts of retail services on the manufacturer and retailer's pricing decisions. Xu et al. (28) investigate a price competition among manufacture and a retailer in a dual-channel supply chain where a two-way revenue sharing contract is proposed to coordinate the supply chain. Besides, many other researches such as Chen et al. have been working on dual channel supply chain; we also consider the dual channel supply chain context in this paper.
The following Table 1 provides a comparison of this work with past researchers' works. In this study, we study a dual channel supply chain model consisting of the manufacturer and retailer where the manufacturer sells the product in both direct and retail channels. Additionally, we assume that the consumers' demand is sensitive on selling price of each player, delivery time for direct channel and retail service for the market where the demand in the direct market (online shopping) has negative effect on higher selling price, lengthy delivery time for direct market and more retail servicing from retail market. But the demand in the retail market has positive effect on lengthy delivery time for direct market and more retail servicing from retail market and it has only negative effect on higher selling price. The manufacturer sells the products through the direct channel by a mentioned maximum delivery time which can adjustable according to customers' demand with extra delivery charge. We formulate and analyze the models under integrated, vertical Nash and manufacturer Stackelberg model scenarios. Our objective is to find the best strategies for selling price, delivery time and retail service that in order to optimize the profit under different scenarios.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates fundamental assumptions and notations.
Formulation of the model is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes numerical analysis. Sensitivity analysis are illustrated in Section 5. Finally, conclusion of the paper is provided in Section 6.
Fundamental Assumptions and Notation

Assumptions
The following assumptions are adopted to develop the model. (iv) Selling price for direct channel is less by a percentage than selling price of retail channel.
(v) Stock-out situation in each stage is not allowed.
Notations
The following notations are used throughout the paper.
D(m)
Demand rate of the customer for the manufacturer.
D(r)
Demand rate of the customer for the retailer. A The forecasted potential demand if the products are free of charge.
λ
The ratio of forecasted demand for the direct channel when the selling prices of the products for the both channels are zero.
µ
The percentage of the customers buy the products according to mentioned delivery time.
ν
The percentage of the customers buy the products according to half of delivery charge condition.
Formulation of the model
Nowadays, online shopping has absorbed a lot of interest among people around the world. Therefore, the marketing strategies of the manufacturing and retailing companies have been changing by the rising popularity of online marketing. But, there is some difference between online marketing and marketing from retail shops. In the online shopping, there is a mentioned delivery time for each product. If one orders to deliver the product before mentioned time then an extra delivery cost will be charged according to delivery time. Conversely, in the retail shopping, one can obtain the products directly and retail service is also provided to the customers. It is important to mention that decoration, labour and rent cost of the shops and holding cost of the products are vital factors for the retail shops. Generally, the selling price for products in the online marketing is less than the retail shop due to the above-mentioned factors. Considering the before mentioned factors, we generate a selling price, delivery time and retail service dependent demand structure where the demand in the direct market (online shopping) has a negative effect on higher selling price, lengthy delivery time for direct market and more retail servicing from the retail market. On the other hand, the demand in the retail market has a negative effect on higher selling price and positive effect on lengthy delivery time for the direct market and more retail servicing from the retail market. We consider direct market selling price p m = (1 − ϕ)p r , where p r is the selling price for retail market and ϕ is the discount rate. Hence, the demand structures of the direct market and retail market are respectively
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, λA and (1 − λ)A represent the number of customers preferring the direct channel and retail channel respectively, α represents the price sensitivity parameter, β 1 and β 2 are delivery time sensitivity indices and γ 1 and γ 2 are service level sensitivity indices.
Manufacturer's individual profit
In this study, the manufacturer processes products for both direct and retail selling channels. He delivers a portion of manufactured products to the retailer according to his order quantities. He also sells the products through the direct online market with some delivery cost conditions. First, the manufacturer declares a maximum delivery time. If the customers order products without restriction on mentioned maximum delivery time, then, no extra delivery cost will be charged. But, if the customers' orders to deliver the products by a specific day, then a total delivery cost will be charged. When the customers order to deliver between the above two conditions, then half of the delivery cost will be charged. Out of all online market customers, we assume that µ % of customers buy the products according to mentioned delivery time, ν % of customers buy the products according to half of delivery charge condition and rest of customers buy the products according to full delivery charge condition. Then the profit of the manufacturer is determined by:
Π m = Revenue from sales to retailer + Revenue from direct sales in market − Production cost
where P c is production cost and d c is delivery cost.
Retailer's individual profit
In this model, the retailer sells the products through the retail market as well as the manufacturer sells the same products through the online channel. The retailer provides retail servicing to the customers. The retailer will try to increase his profit with the negative effect on higher selling price and positive effect on lengthy delivery time for the direct market and more retail servicing from the retail market. Thus, the profit of the retailer is determined by:
where η is retail servicing cost.
Integrated profit
From equation (3) and equation (4), the integrated profit of the whole supply chain is
Now, we optimize the profit function of the supply chain with respect to the retailer's selling price, delivery time and retail servicing. Differentiating equation (5) with respect to p r , l and s, we have
Now, we check the sufficient condition of optimality. (5) is
The profit function is jointly concave if the Hessian matrix (14) is negative definite. H is negative definite iff all of its three leading principal minors alternate in sign. Now, order one leading principle minor is (9)). With the help of equation (9) and equation (11), the order two leading principle minor is
Using equation (9) to equation (13) , the order three leading principle minor is
Hence, the integrated profit function Π(p r , s, l) is jointly concave in p r , l and s if det H < 0 at (p * r , s * , l * ).
Proposition 2.
The integrated profit function Π(p r , s, l) is increasing with higher values of A, β 2 , γ 2 and decreasing with higher values of α, λ, β 1 , γ 1 , t m and κ.
Proof. Differentiating Π(p r , s, l) with respect to A, α, λ, β 1 , β 2 , γ 1 , γ 2 , t m and κ, we get ∂Π
> 0 as selling price always greater than all costs, ∂Π ∂α = −p r
function Π is increasing or decreasing with x if ∂Π ∂x > 0 or < 0 respectively. Hence the proof.
Vertical Nash (VN) model
In this model structure, the manufacturer and the retailer take decisions independently. We assume that the retailer sales margin is m = p r − w. Here, the retailer optimizes his individual profit with respect to sale margin (m) and retail service (s) for given wholesale price (w) and manufacturer delivery time (l). Now, we check that the solutions are optimal. The Hessian matrix of the profit function is are optimal strategies for the retailer.
Here, the manufacturer also optimizes his individual profit function (3) with respect to w and l considering constant retailer's sale margin m and retail service s. Substituting p r = w + m in the profit function (3), then differentiating with respect to w and l, we have
. Putting the values of w vn in the equation ∂Π vn m (w,l) ∂l = 0, we have l = l vn . Now, we check the sufficient condition of optimality for supplier strategies. The Hessian matrix of the profit function is
> 0, then the strategies w vn and l vn of the manufacturer will be optimal.
Now, solving four equations
, w = w vn and l = l vn , we get the Nash equilibrium point (w * vn , l * vn , m * vn , s * vn ). Proof. Differentiating Π(p r , s, l) with respect to A, α, λ, β 1 , β 2 , γ 1 , γ 2 , t m and κ, we get ∂Πm
A function Π m is increasing or decreasing with x if ∂Πm ∂x > 0 or < 0 respectively. Hence the proof.
Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) model
In this model structure, the manufacturer takes decision on wholesale price w and delivery time l after observing the decision of the retailer on the retailer's selling price p r and retail service s. So, the retailer calculates his selling price p r and retail service s for given wholesale price w and manufacturer's delivery time l.
Proposition 5. The retailer's profit function Π ms r (p r , s) is jointly concave in p r and s for given w and l.
Proof. Differentiating the retailer's profit function (4) with respect to p r and s, we have
Solving ∂Πr(pr,s) ∂pr = 0 and ∂Πr(pr,s) ∂s = 0, we get and s ms , the profit of the manufacturer (see equation (3)) reduces to
where
. Proposition 6. The manufacturer's profit function Π ms m (w, l) is jointly concave in w and l if A 2 < 0,
Proof. Differentiating equation (16) with respect to w and l, we have
. Putting the value of w in the equation ∂Π ms m ∂l = 0, we have
Solving the equation, we get the value of l. Now, we check the sufficient conditions of optimality at (w * ms , l * ms ). If the Hessian matrix of the profit function (16) is negative definite at (w * ms , l * ms ) i.e.
, then the solution will be optimal at (w * ms , l * ms ). Hence, the profit function Π ms m (w, l) is jointly concave in w and l if the above conditions are satisfied.
Numerical example
In this section, the model is illustrated numerically to explore the analytical results and to study insight behavior of the model. We consider the values of the parameters in appropriate units as follows: λ = 0.40, α = 12, β 1 = 2.0, γ 1 = 0.5, β 2 = 0.25, γ 2 = 1.5, t m = 10 unit, ϕ = 0.25, p m = (1 − ϕ)p r , c = $12, A = 1500, η = $7.5, d c = $1.5, µ = 0.6, ν = 0.3, κ = 0.2, P c = $2.5. The optimal solutions for the different models discussed are given in Table 2 . 
Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we discuss the sensitivity of the key parameters and observe the variation of the decision variables and expected profit for the different cases with varying key parameters.
From the Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 , we observe that in all the cases, total supply chain profits and profits of the manufacturer and retailer are increasing with the higher values of the demand function parameter A. The total supply chain profits and profits of the manufacturer and retailer for all the model structure decrease (see Fig. 3, Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 ) with increasing values of the demand function parameter α and β 1 .
With the higher values of the parameter λ, the total supply chain profits and profits of the retailer for all the models are decreasing but the manufacturer's profits for all the models are decreasing ( Fig. 7 and Fig.   8 ). When the parameter ϕ is increasing, the total supply chain profits and profits of the manufacturer for all the models are increasing but the retailer's profits for all the models are decreasing ( Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 ).
From the Fig. 11 to Fig. 14, we observe that the total chain profits for all the cases are gradually increasing with higher values of β 2 and γ 2 . The retailer's profit and manufacturer's profit for all the model structure are increasing with higher values of β 2 but the retailer's profit for all the model structure is increasing and the manufacturer's profit for all the model structure is slowly decreasing with higher values of γ 2 .
When the parameter κ is increasing, the total profit of the chain for integrated and vertical Nash and the profits of the manufacturer for all the model structure are decreasing but the total profit in manufacturer Stackelberg and profits of the retailer for all the model structure are increasing (see Fig. 15 and Fig. 16 ). Fig. 17 and Fig. 18 , we see that total chain profit for integrated and vertical Nash model and profits of retailer are decreasing gradually and the total chain profit for Manufacturer Stackelberg model and the profits of the manufacturer are increasing with the higher values of parameter η.
From the
Conclusion
In the proposed article, a dual channel supply chain model with one manufacturer and one retailer is developed where the manufacturer sells products through both the direct and retail channels. We formulate and analyze the dual channel model considering selling price of each player, delivery time for direct channel and retail service dependent customer demand pattern where the direct channel has negative effect on higher selling price, lengthy delivery time for direct market and more retail servicing from retail market but the retail channel has only negative effect on higher selling price and positive effect on lengthy delivery time for direct market and more retail servicing from retail market. In the direct channel, the manufacturer declares maximum delivery time in the beginning but if the customers order to deliver the product according to their wishes, the products will be delivered with an extra delivery charge according to delivery time. In the retail channel, the customers are benefitted by the retail service and direct connection with the products. In this model, we consider that the selling price of the products for the direct channel is less by a percentage of the selling price of the products in the retail channel for the reason of decoration, huge rent cost of the shops, holding cost of the products for the retail shops. We formulate both centralized and decentralized models and study these models analytically and numerically. In the decentralized scenario, we analyze the model under vertical Nash and manufacturer Stackelberg scenario. We analyze the model with a numerical example and the sensitivity analysis of the key parameters are also discussed graphically to check the existence of the model.
The major contribution of the model is to study a dual channel supply chain model with a selling price of each player, delivery time for direct channel and retail service dependent customer demand pattern. We also study the model assuming that the delivery time of the products is adjustable according to customers' demand with extra delivery charge according to delivery time. We discuss the decentralized model under vertical Nash game and manufacturer Stackelberg game structure.
In future, the present model can be extended by including the multiple rivalry retailers. We could study our model with stochastic types of competitive market demand. We also may extend the model by introducing different contracts policies among the members. This study can be extended incorporating return-refund policy. Figure 5 : Total profit versus parameter β1. 
